

# Four ways in which Market Shaping Policies are not Paternalistic

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## Situating the research

- Common topics: markets vs equality; limits of markets (e.g. prostitution)
- My topic: “not about market transactions that are too bad to exist, but about those too good not to exist”

## Market Shaping Policies

- “A policy aimed at creating markets that were previously absent due to technological limitations or economic viability.”
- Examples: German Energiewende, the iPhone
- Mechanisms
- Grand Challenges

## Motivational Paternalism

*X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z only if*

“X does so only because X believes Z will improve the welfare of Y (...) or in some way promote the interests, value, or good of Y.” (Dworkin 2017)

Reply: Motivation is not individual good, but non-welfarist goals (justice, survival of just society)

## Liberty-restricting Paternalism

*X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z only if*

“Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y.” (Dworkin 2017)

Reply: Purchasing or selling a good is not prohibited.

## Choice-improving Paternalism

Nudge: “help make better choices”

Cafeteria

Reply: An option is added or modified, choice is left to consumer.

## “Knowing better” Paternalism

*X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z only if*

“X substitutes her agency for Y’s on the ground that compared to Y’s agency (...), X regards her agency to be (...) superior to Y’s.” (Dworkin 2015)

Reply: No substitution of agency.

“the government, not meddling with them, but not trusting the object solely to their care, establishes, side by side with their arrangements, an agency of its own for a like purpose” (Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*).